MOUNTAINS OR MOLEHILLS? Permanent Physical Profiles in The Army Reserve
They arrived at Ft. Dix, NJ in the spring of 1996 -soldiers from the Army Reserve's 88th Regional Support Command (RSC) in support of Operation Joint Endeavor.
Among them were three soldiers with permanent physical profiles who had not been boarded to determine deployability. The mobilization message that brought them to Ft.
Dix contained specific instructions that soldiers with permanent physical profiles, who had not been boarded, would not be mobilized. The commander responsible for the contingent from the 88th, however, brought these three Army Reserve (USAR) soldiers to Ft. Dix to highlight his frustration, and the frustration of other USAR commanders with the inability of the Army system to support him. It seems that this 1996 version of "catch 22" is that until the USAR soldiers comes on active duty, he cannot be boarded -but he cannot come onto active duty until he is boarded! The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of permanent physical profiles (P3 and P4) on the mobilization deployment readiness of US Army Reserve (USAR) units. It also examines the current ability of Army and USAR policies in identification, tracking, and administration of personnel with P3 and P4 medical profiles.
The Chief of Staff of the Army has been concerned for some time about the deployability and mobilization readiness of his total force. In March 1995, the CSA stated that "I think it's time we focus on our nondeployables. The numbers I saw in Forces Command were too high. I am not sure that we can afford to carry that number across the force."
1 The task fell to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Army (DCSPER) with guidance to concentrate initially on permanent (P3/P4) physical profiles.
Concurrent with the Army Chief of Staff and DCSPER's concern" with the nondeployable problem, the Army Research Institute (ART) included permanent profile/deployability questions in the 1995 Annual Army Survey. The questions were designed to determine the accuracy of the Active Army's standard systems' reporting of non-deployable numbers -with the feeling the non-deployables were being underreported. The extent of under-reporting was found to be significantly greater than expected. ARI found that the army actually had 4 to 5 times more soldiers with permanent profiles, a percentage of whom would be determined to be non-deployable, than were being captured by unit status reports (USRs)or the SIDPERS personnel system.
The survey found that the USRs reported the fewest numbers, SIDPERS reported about 2 1/2 times as many, and the actual survey numbers were significantly greater ( Figure 1 ). service or are the result of incidents or injuries that occurred while the reservist was is an official military status such as drill or annual training. The majority of the permanent physical profiles in the US AR consist of just such conditions. This is" where the system fails the RC commander, who is concerned not only with his unit mobilization readiness, but with the health of his command and the soldiers assigned to him. The Commander has no capability, short of finding a soldier unfit for continued service, to evaluate his capability to mobilize in his specialty and contribute to the mission. The non serviceconnected disability processing system for the USAR soldier appears in figure 3 below. profile shadow world that ARI found in the AC would not be significant in the RC due to lack of easy access to the medics and the lesser impact of a P3/P4 profile on an RC soldier's career; (3) The problem would not be of such magnitude as to require a massive infusion of funds, manpower, and effort; and (4) The apparent problem is magnified by the existence of some of these soldiers in virtually every unit and organization in the USAR and their visibility to the commander.
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In order to assess the extent of the problem in the RC, a sample group was needed.
The 88th Reserve Support Command (RSC), the command that highlighted the problem at Next, the analysis looks at the 979 soldiers from the 88 th RSC who have P3/P4
profiles on their physicals. First, the P3/P4 profile group by gender is representative of the population as a whole (see figure 7 ). The profiled soldier population was divided into three groups in order to examine just how serious the profiles might be. Soldiers with a single P3 and the remaining profile a picket fence (11111) were the first group followed by those with a P3 and nothing worse than 2's in the remaining profile and lastly by those with multiple P3 's and/or P4's. The data was then analyzed as displayed in the following charts. There was slight variation by sex and severity of the profile with male soldiers increasing in percentage with worsening of the profile.
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The aggregated profiles are shown in figure 9 below.
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The actual breakdown of the profiles are shown in figures 10-12 below: Lastly we looked at the numbers of soldiers assigned to deploying vs. non-deploying organizations with the following results: (figure 13) On Site Validation. On-site validation of the SDDPERS numbers against the unit records was conducted in April 1997 to assess the accuracy of the SDDPERS data, look for hip-pocket profiles, and look for any other inconsistencies in the system. Six units from the 88 01 RSC were selected with a total of 957 soldiers' records. A summary of the on-site data follows ( Table 1 The above data indicates that the SIDPERS records give a fairly accurate count in the aggregate. SIDPERS identified 47 soldiers in the initial run. When balanced out with gains and losses and errors between SIDPERS and the actual records, the total number of P3/P4 soldiers in the six units came to 47 v>v fen extrapolated back to EOM Nov 96. The largest deviation was within the HHC of the 88 th RSC where the unit had not been updating SIDPERS with data from the permanent profile forms when they were more current than the latest physical.
DISTRIBUTION OF SINGLE P3 PROFILES
88TH RSC -ASGD TO NON-DEPL VS DEPL ORGs
Given the above data and verification, the numbers of US AR soldiers with permanent profiles extrapolate as follows ( This research found no evidence of hip-pocket profiles. Although the original supposition that they would be found to be minimal was based on difficulty of access of RC soldiers to military medical care, it appears they don't exist primarily because the RC soldier cannot hide them. Whereas an active army soldier's personnel service company is generally located across post, his medical records are located in the medical treatment facility, and his first sergeant/company is in a third site, the typical reservist has his medical records, personnel records, and first sergeant/company all in the same location.
Invariably, in the units visited, the unit administrators, personnel NCOs and full-time officers knew the medical status of each soldier in the unit. It is nearly impossible for an RC unit member to hide a permanent profile.
Full-time personnel in the units that were visited reported actively working to resolve permanent profiles through fitness for duty physical exams. Some of this is evidenced in the losses shown in the above table. All reported that it took an inordinate amount of time and effort to deal with these few soldiers.
Summary and Conclusions.
1. Permanent physical profiles in the USAR do not significantly detract from mobilization and deployment readiness. The total permanently profiled unit population in the USAR is between five and six thousand -2.5-3.0%. Of that 5-6K, 30-40% are in non-deploying organizations leaving 3-4K soldiers out of a total of 20 IK whose deployability is in question.
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2. USAR unit commanders and staff are very frustrated with the inability of the current policies and systems to deal with a very small, but omnipresent segment of their soldiers.
3. The mobilization deployability indicator code in SIDPERS is not being used appropriately. Over 90% of the P3/P4 population is coded YY which indicates worldwide deployability with no limitations -not a likely condition.
4. No evidence of hip pocket profiles was found in the USAR units visited.
5. Although the total backlogged P3/P4 population in the USAR is estimated at 5-6K, the annual new population is smaller than this -probably in the 400-600 range -not significant numbers.
6. DoD Directive 1332.18 and DoD Instruction 1332.38 now direct the Disability Evaluation System to board RC soldiers for ;on-service connected disability. RC soldiers with at least 15 years of qualifying service may now be placed in the retired reserve with eligibility for retired pay at age 60 upon being found disabled.
Recommendations.
1. Individual RC commanders must make an initial deployability determination for each soldier under their command who has a permanent profile.
2. Soldiers determined to be non-deployable or needing further evaluation be deferred into the Physical Disability System for board action in accordance with DoD Instruction 1332.38.
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